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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
Department Editor: Frank Winter*

A NEW APPROACH TO AIRLINE RATES AND COMPETITION
of economic regulation,'
AS an exercise of the CAB's extensive powers
2

the case of Southern Service to the West presented a not uncommon
problem. 8 Six certificated air carriers were applying for various new routes
or route extensions in order to provide one-carrier through service. The
service was to be between points in southern and southeastern parts of the
country, at one end, and points on the west coast at the other end.' Voluntary interchange proposals were presented by the carriers and several specific proposals were offered by the Board.5 The Board took this opportunity
* Student Ed.,Legal Publications Bd.,Northwestern University School of Law.

152 STAT. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §401 (1951). The following are the other
sections which are most germane to a discussion of economic regulation: 52
STAT. 977, §§2, 205(a), 401(a), 401(h), 403(a), 404(a), 406(a), 406(b), 415,
1002(d), 1002(e) ; respectively, 49 U.S.C. §§402, 425(a), 481(a), 481(h), 483(a),
486(b), 495, 642 (d), 642(e). For a history of economic regulation see Netterville's The Regulation & IrregularAir Carriers,16 J. AIR L. & CoM. 414, (1949);
note, 57 YALE L. J., 1053 (1948).
2 Docket No. 1102 (Order Serial No. E-5090), decided Jan. 30, 1951.
S E.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc.-Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity, 1 C.A.A. 573 (1940); Delta Air Corp.-Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity-Additional Service to Atlanta and Birmingham, 2 C.A.B.
447 (1941); Northwest Airlines, Inc.-Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity-Additional Service to Canada, 2 C.A.B. 627 (1941); Eastern Air
Lines,
Inc.-Additional Angeles Service,
Service,
4 C.A.B.
(1943);
Western
Air
Lines, Inc.-Denver-Los Washington
6 C.A.B.
199 825
(1944),
aijrmed,
United
Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 155 F. 2d 169 (D.C. Cir., 1946).
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4American Airlines, Inc., sought an extension
Paso to New Orleans via San Antonio and Houston; (b) from Dallas to New
to Los
OrleansInc.
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fromFrancisco.
via requested
route: (a)
Houston; an
its Angeles
andextension
(c) fromof Los
Lines,
to San
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Air
Angeles via Houston and San Antonio; (b) from Dallas/Fort Worth to Albuquerque via Lubbock and Clovis; (c) from Dallas/Fort Worth to Los Angeles;
and (d) from Dallas to Houston. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. proposed an extension
of its route: (a) from San Antonio to San Francisco and Oakland via El Paso,
Tucson, Phoenix, San Diego and Los Angeles; and (b) from New Orleans across
the Gulf to Miami and Tampa. National Airlines Inc. desired an extension of
its route: from (a) New Orleans to San Francisco/Oakland via Galveston, Houston, San Antonio, El Paso, Tucson, El Centro/Brawley, Yuma, San Diego, Los
Angeles/Long Beach and Fresno; and (b) beyond Houston to New Orleans.
Braniff Airways, Inc. petitioned for route extensions: (a) beyond San Antonio
to San Diego, Los Angeles and San Francisco via El Paso, Tucson and Phoenix;
(b) beyond Lubbock via Roswell to Phoenix and then to the west coast; (c)
beyond Amarillo to the west coast via Albuquerque and Phoenix; and (d) beyond
Houston to New Orleans. Continental Air Lines, Inc. proposed the following
extension of its routes: (a) from San Antonio to New Orleans via Austin,
Houston, Beaumont-Port Arthur and Baton Rouge with a branch from Houston
via Dallas to Fort Worth with branches from Fort Worth to Wichita Falls and
San Angelo; (b) from El Paso via Tucson to Phoenix with a branch from Phoenix
via San Diego to Los Angeles and another via Las Vegas and Fresno to San
Francisco-Oakland; and (c) from Albuquerque to Phoenix.
5 American Airlines, Inc. suggested that the through service requirements
of New Orleans and points west could be met by a Delta-American interchange.
It suggested that the Houston-San Antonio area be served by a Braniff-American
interchange. The Board proposed a National-Delta-American interchange. Delta
Air Lines viewed the Delta-American and the National-Delta-American interchanges with favor. Continental Air Lines applied for approval of an interchange
agreement with Trans World Airlines. National Airlines, Inc. indicated its
willingness to enter the National-Delta-American interchange.
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to launch into a full-scale investigation of "the extent to which all through
services found required in this area could be provided by means of interchange agreements." 6 Such an analysis entailed a study of most of the
basic economic factors of the industry. The following study is designed to
highlight the Board's approach.
In order to determine whether interchange agreements or route extensions would better satisfy the test of "public convenience and necessity,"
the Board turned first to the economic results of the proposed extensions.
The Board evinced particular concern about the cost of additional equipment, increased operating expenses and the diversion of revenue into areas
where service is "adequate."' 7 To the extent that revenue from the additional service failed to cover costs, or resulted in diversion of revenue from
more profitable routes of the carrier, or resulted in diversion of revenue from
other carriers, higher mail rates would be required.8 The Board regards the
imposition of restrictions as the only method of limiting the diversion.
However, the Board was cognizant of the fact that these undefined restrictions are not a remedy but a palliative at best. 9 In considering a limitation
upon competition as a means of reducing diversion of revenues, the Board
indicates the intimate relation between "competitive" and "economic"
factors.
Was the interaction of these factors apparent to Congress in 1938?
If so, to what extent does Congressional policy suggest an adjustment of
this interaction?
6 Page 26 of the mimeographed opinion, docket No. 1102, order serial No.
E-5090, decided Jan. 30, 1951. The Board denied all the applications for route
extensions detailed in note 4. Instead the Board established three interchange
agreements, i.e., agreements for single carrier service over the connecting routes
of two or more carriers. These are concisely described in Member Lee's dissent,
pp. 2-3:
"There are three different and separate interchange arrangements constituting the service from the southeastern states to the Texas points
where they deliver the traffic to American. These are: (1) an interchange
between Delta and American from Atlanta to Dallas and from New Orleans
to Dallas; (2) an interchange between National, Delta and American
from Miami through Tampa and New Orleans to Dallas; and (3) an
interchange between Braniff, Continental, and American serving Houston
and San Antonio and joining American at El Paso."
With regard to the substantive effects of the Board's opinion, Member Lee
felt that the action created an improper and inferior route structure. "The
majority's decision in this case not only deprives Houston and San Antonio of
any southern transcontinental service, while granting Dallas-Fort Worth two
such services, but it also deprives Houston and San Antonio of single-plane service to Florida." Page 4 of his dissent. The Board adopted the gist of Member
Lee's suggestions in a supplemental opinion. Southern Service to the West
(supplemental opinion) ; Docket No. 1102. (Order Serial No. E-5531). Decided
July 13, 1951. The present discussion will concern itself only with the questions
of competition presented in the original opinion. For any earlier discussion of
For
the same general topic, see Comment, 12 J. Air L. & COM. 280 (1941).
informative statements regarding interchanges, see Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
2 C.A.B. 627 (1941) ; Northwest Airlines, Inc., 6 C.A.B. 217, 244 (1944) (dissenting opinion) ; Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 6 C.A.B. 429, 463 (1945) (dissenting
opinion).
7 Underlying the Board's entire discussion of costs and diversion is the
implicit assumption that there will be no significant increase in air travel as a
result of the Board's action.
8 Beginning with the decision in the case of Mid-Continent Airlines, 1 C.A.A.
45 (1939), the Board has fixed mail rates so that needy carriers would obtain a
total revenue somewhat in excess of their total costs. See Altschul, Economic
Regulation of Air Transport, 12 J. AIR L. & CoM. 163 (1941) for discussion of
mail rates.
9 "Some diversion might be eliminated by the imposition of restrictions but
restrictions have been found to be at-best only partially effective." Page 13 of
the mimeographed opinion. Presumably these "restrictions" are to be limitations upon the amount of diversion that will be permitted.
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A reading of the Civil Aeronautics Act will indicate that Congress was
aware of the possible effect of competition on the "sound development of an
air transportation system." 10 Congress regarded competition as being in
the public interest when it was used to achieve the "sound development" of
the industry. This is not to say that Congress would regard competition
for other purposes as inimical to the public interest. 1'
The Board adopts the view that "competition" must be subordinate to
the establishment of a "sound economic basis."'1 The majority offers five
reasons why the system must, be economically sound. 18 It is conceivable
that the exigencies of national defense might require the development of
the air system in a manner and to an extent that was not economically
sound. Insofar as that is true, the contentions of the majority are invalid.
Nevertheless, the other reasons presented argue strongly for the creation
of an economically sound and self-sufficient air transport system.
The Economics of C.A.B. Policy on Competition
The statement that competition is to be subordinate to the quest for a
"sound economic basis" suggests the basic issue. Efforts to promote competition may involve measures which the Board regards as economically
unsound. Query: to what extent will "competition"' 14 be restricted by the
"statutory mandate looking toward the development of an economically
sound air transportation system"? The Board has indicated that the restriction may be "insurmountable."' 5 The limits of this barrier appear to
be outside of the Board's field of vision. Rather than face the issue and
1049 U.S.C. §402. "In the exercise and performance of its powers and
duties under this chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other
things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity...
"(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development
of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign
and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the
national defense. . .

."

Section 2 contains the declarations of policy which are

to guide all actions by the Board.
11 The section quoted in the preceding footnote indicates that "other things"
are to be considered as being in the public interest. It would seem that competition which was designed to reduce rates and make the carriers self-sufficient
might be one of the "other things." The qualifying phrase "to the extent necessary" does not defeat this construction of the term "competition." There is
nothing in the attainment of lower rates and self-sufficient carriers that hampers the "sound development" of the system.
is no mandate to seek competition merely for the sake
12 "This (§2 (b) (d))
of having competition. It is a recognition by the Congress that the provision of
competitive service is subject, like all other aspects of the air transport business,
to the paramount necessity that the system be developed on a sound economic
basis." Page 21 of the mimeographed opinion.
'8 Page 21 of the mimeographed opinion of Jan. 30, 1951: (1) "the many
millions of dollars which have been and are being paid in the form of mail pay
to air carriers"; (2) "the millions which have been and are being expended in
connection with airway facilities"; (3) "the need for making this new transportation available to the greatest number of people through lower costs and fares";
tY4) "the vital importance of air transportation to the national defense"; (5)
e need for anticipating unfavorable economic conditions.
14 In the present case competition would have taken the form of a substantial
expansion of routes. However, it would seem that the discussion by the Board
is to be applied to all phases of the question of competition.
15

"..

. the conclusion would seem to be inescapable that, in light of present

facts and conditions, the difficulty of reconciling any material route expansion
with the statutory mandate looking toward the development of an economically
sound air transportation system would seem to present to the applicant a major,
if not insurmountable, task and that under such circumstances serious consideration should be given to interchange operations as an alternative measure for
meeting the future air service needs." Pp. 25-26 of the mimeographed opinion.
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attempt to define clear but tentative standards, the Board halted, turned
sharply and retreated into a discussion of interchanges. 1 6
Interchange agreements are suggested as a means of providing the re17
quired service. However, even these agreements are subject to conditions.
After stating these conditions which the agreements must satisfy the discussion is enigmatically summarized: "This is but another way of saying
that an interchange to be in the public interest must not result in the creation of uneconomic competition."'I s

This, then, is the Board's suggested solution. The Board believes that
the demands of both economy and competition can be met by interchanges
which do not result in "uneconomic competition." What does this proposal
mean?
The mysterious cloud that surrounds the phrase "uneconomical competition" is not dispelled by the use of the words in the above context. However,
the phrase is used while discussing another subject: monopoly. 19
In this context difficult problems which are peculiar to interchanges,
such as possible conflicts of interest between the carriers, are removed.
When the phrase is used in this latter context the clouds begin to lift. As
the quotation in the footnote suggests, the Board believes that refusal to
establish competition in this instance would be justified. 20 Thus, the Board
implies that it will establish competition only when the failure to do so
cannot be justified. Board Member Lee declares in his dissenting opinion
that competition should be promoted except when it cannot be justified. Is
the choice necessarily limited to these two alternatives?
A New Approach to Adequacy of Service

While considering new routes, route extensions or interchange agreements, the Board has concerned itself with the effects of its decisions upon
16 For a fine discussion of the basis for compulsory interchange agreement,

see Jannes, Westwood, Compulsory Interchange of Aircraft Between Connecting
Carriers,34 VA. L. REv. 1 (1948). The views of the Interstate Commerce Com-

mission regarding interchanges are set forth in Seatrain Lines Inc. v.Akron,
C. & Y. Ry., 226 I.C.C. 7 (1938), as modified, 243 I.C.C. 199 (1940), as modified,
259 I.C.C. 297 (1944).

Pp. 32-33 of the mimeographed opinion: "...
(T)he interchanges which
would cause the minimum interference
with the existing route pattern," would be "over reasonably direct routes . . .
17

would best satisfy the public interest ...

would leave substantially undisturbed the historical participation of the existing
carriers . . .would not cause undue diversion."

18 P. 33 of the mimeographed opinion. (Emphasis added.)
19 Pp. 52-53 of the mimeographed opinion: "Certainly to authorize an interchange which would-channel the limited traffic here involved into another existing transcontinental system in order to provide uneconomic competition to the
transcontinental carrier that has had the largest participation in it would constitute action difficult to reconcile with the economic standards of the Civil Aeronautics Act ....

Interchange . ... can be beneficial to the public and the entire

industry as a means of providing through service without the wasteful consequences that follow uneconomic competition. If, however, a transcontinental
carrier is permitted to utilize the interchange agreement as a device to gain entry
into competitive areas where its historic participation in the traffic has been
negligible or nil, both the public and the industry are certain to reap adverse
economic consequences.
I"... Were the Board to set about creating such a pattern of air service it

would be decreeing the indefinite postponement of that day when a subsidy-free
air transport system would be able to provide modern air service to the public

at progressively lowering costs." (Emphasis added.)
For an earlier discussion of the monopoly issue, see United Air Lines Transport Corp. Acquisition of Western Air Express Corp., 1 C.A.A. 739 (1940).
20 It may be said that the difference is only one of degree.
However, the
question of whether competition is to be viewed affirmatively or negatively goes
a long way in determining one's views on related questions. See the suggestions
in this article, infra.
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the other carriers as well as upon the applicants. It has considered the cost
of whatever new equipment may be required, additional cost of operation,
diversion of revenue, the effect on the mail rates and the added revenue to
be obtained from the new service. The cities to be served were analyzed
in terms of the population, value added by its manufacturers, the percentage
increase of these factors in recent years, the nature of its industry, the
number of air passengers per 10,000 persons per month, the location of universities or military installations in or near city, the volume of air express,
air freight and trade in general. Certainly these are relevant considerations
in determining the air traffic potential of any given area. No one can deny
that such potential is limited. It could be argued, however, that the limit
is not the one perceived by the Board.
After revealing much concern about diversion, mail rates, additional
investment and expense, cost per passenger-mile, and financial reserves for
adverse conditions, the Board went no further. The members failed to suggest anything more helpful than the avoidance of "uneconomic competition."
Member Lee offered only a return to the Board's previous approach to
competition. That is a start but a more positive plan suggests itself.
The Board's determination of the "adequacy of service" has been referred
to previously. 21 If most of the people desiring air transportation are being
22
served then the Board is content to say that the service is "adequate."
The Board itself has not undertaken to stimulate the demand for air service. Consequently, the service remained "adequate" until extraneous
forces like population increases and increased industrial output stimulated
the demand. Likewise, the Board has found the service to be "adequate" in
instancess where only a minor fraction of the potential traffic was being
2
served.
One way to increase air travel and air freight would be to lower fares
and rates. 24 This does not mean the Board should provide for a universal
reduction. It means that in selected instances the Board should seek reductions with an eye toward increasing the number of users in such a manner
as to increase the total revenue. 25 Where one carrier serves a locality, the
applicability of this plan should certainly be considered. The same would
apply where there are several carriers..
In an area served by several airlines, the larger carriers have an advantage over the smaller carriers by virtue of the former's prestige. This competitive advantage might be offset somewhat if the smaller carrier were
permitted to offer lower rates for similar service. If the plan were well
executed it would increase the total revenue of the smaller airline. Also,
it might increase the general demand for air transportation in the area and,
21 See note 7, supra.
22 Apparently this would be true even if only one carrier served the area.
The presumption would be that the service is "adequate" and that there is no
need for competition. See p. 12 of the mimeographed opinion.
28 This is not meant to imply that the traffic potential in any given area is
unlimited. However, it is suggested that the limit is considerably beyond the one
the Board employs in ascertaining whether the service is "adequate."
24 For a different view, see Jones & Davis, The "Air Coach" Experiment and
National Air Transport Policy, 17 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 418 (1950). "But if the

trend toward coach fares is allowed to grow unchecked to the point where the

basic structure is substantially reduced, then it seems clear that progress toward
economic stability will be reversed and government funds will be needed on a
larger and longer basis if our airline system is to be maintained in its present
form:"
25 In some instances this may mean that rates will have to be lowered to a
point that will appreciably increase the load factor required to cover costs. With
regard to the determination of these costs, see Comment, 15 J. AxR L. & CoM.
354 (1948). See Western Air Express Corp., Mail Rate, 1 C.A.A. 341 (1939).
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thus, redound to the benefit of all the carriers concerned. Should all the
carriers serving a given area be reluctant to adopt the plan, the Board might
do well to introduce a new carrier that was more susceptible to the advantages.
This course of action is not intended to be a panacea. The economic
difficulties are formidable but not insurmountable. First, if the market for
air freight and travel has been exhausted, there is little justification for a
plan that assumes the contrary. But can it be denied that the air transport
market generally, or, at least, certain specific markets therein have not been
fully explored? Second, as suggested, where feasible the exploration might
take the form of lower rates by one of the smaller carriers. To prevent
losses to this carrier, a competing carrier would not be permitted to offer
reduced rates until the market can support both carriers without loss to
either. Third, reduced rates may require less luxurious service and accommodations. The prime asset of the airlines is their ability to provide safe,
rapid transportation. This service is unique. The airlines should seek to
provide it at the lowest possible rates. They should not divert their
resources in an effort to emulate a first-class hotel. Fourth, service at
reduced rates need not be limited to the larger cities. It is conceded that
such service requires planes with increased seating capacity and high load
factors. However, a basic premise of this article is that in some cases the
reduction in fares will be more than offset by the number of additional users
who are attracted by the reduction. If the premise is sound, the plan is
applicable to cities both small and large and especially to "loss routes" which
are unprofitable but which the C.A.B. requires. Fifth, the nature of the
equipment to be used presents another problem. To compensate for the
rate reduction the seating capacity must be increased about 25% where
possible equipment like the DC-6 should be used. In any event the equipment should be equal to that used in standard service between the points to
be served. No additional equipment should be purchased until the trial
proves successful. Where major traffic centers are to be served, only offpeak operations should be permitted. Where less traffic is available, regular
schedules should be used. In either event it would seem that presently
available equipment could be used. Where this is not the case, it may be
desirable to eliminate or replace one or more of the standard flights and use
the equipment for the purposes of the experiment. Sixth, any computation
of costs must include not only variable costs due to the reduced rate service
but also a liberal provision for diversion of revenue and fixed costs attributable to the purchase of new equipment, when necessary.
Viewed in the terms stated above, the question of reduced rates goes to
the heart of the airline industry. If carriers do not regard rates as a
challenge, if they do not seek to meet the challenge, they are not truly
competitive. In the absence of such competition-the public is the loser.
If the'goal is the attainment of an economically sound air trarsportation
system, competition can be an aid, not an obstacle. Competition must be
viewed affirmatively. Competition must be defined as a genuine effort to
establish a self-sufficient air industry while providing the best possible
service for the greatest number of persons at the lowest rates.
The possible benefits of the plan suggested herein are numerous. First,
the airline industry would become aroused to what the public demands from
it. The public has a right to expect a return on its investment. This return
should take the form of an opportunity for increasing numbers of persons
to make use of constantly improving air transport facilities at gradually
lowering rates. The public is justified in demanding that the return be
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paid by the industry, not the government. The industry cannot expect the
government to continue to plan, perform and provide for it. Second, the
Board could view its role with clarity. Appraisal and planning are feasible
only when goals are defined with reasonable precision. Only then would the
Board have the perspective that would enable it to lay down a broad, longterm plan for the industry.2 6 Intermediate objectives like "competition,"
"adequate service" and "honest, economical and efficient management"
would acquire meaning when placed against the background of the ultimate
goal to be attained, namely, the best possible service for the greatest number
of persons at the lowest rates. Third, the benefits to the public in the form
of lower rates and reduced mail-rate payments are apparent. 27 Fourth, the
plan inight serve as a model for other regulated industries.
The initiative should come from the carriers. 28 They are in a position
to know in what areas reductions would be beneficial. If they are hesitant,
the Board has the power to act.29 The Board should be selective in applying the plan. Careful consideration should be given to all relevant factors
to determine whether a reduction of rates in a particular area will result
80
in a commensurate increase in revenue.
In the absence of a general plan, the Board has endeavored to form policy
and decide cases by turning to the specific objectives, such as "competition,"
which are set forth in the Civil Aeronautics Act. However, these phrases
are not self-explanatory. They become meaningful only as part of a program. It has been shown that apart from such a program these objectives
become the subject of fruitless disagreements as to whether the "competition" is "uneconomic" or the service is "adequate." The recent case of
Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd.31 suggests that the Board may have begun to
realize that the public is entitled to more than what the Board has regarded
as "adequate service." The situation summons judicious and bold action.
It is to be hoped that the Board will answer the call.

26 See Cherrington, Objectives and Strategies for Airline Pricing, 18 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 253 (1951) (need for long-range pricing policies) ; Magnusson, Observationts on the Economic Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 18 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 181 (1951) (need for advance statements of policy and interpretation) ;
Sweeney, Policy Formation by Civil Aeronautics Board, 16 J. AIR L. & CoM. 127
(1949) (procedure by which policy is formed).
27 See Northwest Airlines, Inc., Certificate of Convenience and Necessity,
1 C.A.A. 573, 579' (1940).
28 The Civil Aeronautics Act provides that with respect to rates the initial
action should come from the carriers. Sec. 404. Nourse, Economic Planning and
Control in Air Transportation, 14 J. AIR L. & CoM. 436 (1947), suggests the
centralized planning and control which would help effectuate the plan proposed
in this article.
29 Sec. 1002(d), 49 U.S.C. §642 (d).
This power has been used sparingly.
See Air Passenger Tariff Discount Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 242 (1942); Government Travel Discount, 6 C.A.B. 825 (1946).
30 The Board has considered similar plans. See Pioneer Air Lines, 7 C.A.B.
469 (1946); Western Airlines, Mail Rate, 1 C.A.A. 341 (1939).
81-C.A.B. -(1951),
order Serial No. E-5328, decided March 1, 1951.
(A second carrier was permitted to serve the Hawaiian Islands): "By reason
of the monopoly held by parent and subsidiary, Hawaiian was able to charge
whatever fares were necessary to assure its financial stability without regard
to the economy of the traveling public or the necessity of curtailing its costs.
Reference has previously been made to reduction in fares brought about by competition in the Territory. Moreover, the absence of competition permitted Hawaiian to operate at unreasonably high load factors without the necessity of
providing additional service and equipment."
The recent inauguration of DC-6, non-stop, coach service to Los Angeles and
New York from Chicago by United, American and Trans World airlines is a
step in the direction indicated in this article.
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AIR FORCE CRASH INVESTIGATION REPORTS AND
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

T

HE expansion of our military air force during the current national
emergency will most certainly lead to an increase in the number of
personal damage suits filed against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.' The technical nature of the air arm, and its broad scope
of operations, is likely to involve the air force in numerous accidents with
civilians. In any subsequent litigation the victim on his discovery motions
may well face a government claim of privilege as to air force investigation
reports of the accident. Reynolds V. United States2 presents a typical
situation.
An air force plane crashed, while carrying four civilian engineers to test
secret electronics equipment. Three of the civilians were killed, and their
wives brought suits for damages against the United States under the Tort
Claims Act.3 The plaintiffs sought production of the air force investigation
report of the accident on a discovery motion under Federal Rule 34.4 The
district court found good cause, and ordered the defendant to surrender the
documents. The Attorney General and the Secretary of the Air Force thereupon entered a formal claim of privilege. After an extended hearing on
that question, the court ordered the records produced for examination in
order to determine ".

.

. whether the disclosure would violate the Govern-

ment's privilege against disclosure of matters involving the national or
public interest." 5 The government refused to comply, and the court therefore ruled that the issue of negligence on the part of the air force had been
established.6 A summary hearing on the question of damages followed, and
judgment was entered for plaintiffs.7 On appeal the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit sustained the rulings of the trial judge and affirmed the
decision.
The court indicated that, prior to the grant of a discovery order, the
plaintiff must meet the preliminary requirement of a showing of good cause.
Since our judicial system remains adversary in nature, the requirement
seems a proper one. To demand that an opponent surrender information
gleaned through diligent effort would be unconscionable, unless it be neces128 U.S.C. § 1346, 2671 et seq. (1946). The problem seldom arose
during the
mobilization and expansion of the military for World War II, for that was before
the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The government was then immune
to suit for injuries to civilians, unless it surrendered its immunity in each case.
As a result very few damage suits were filed against the United States as
tort feasor, and in such suits as were allowed, the government had the right to
specify whether or not it would submit itself to discovery.
2 192 F. 2nd 987 (3d Cir. 1951) ; 1952 U.S. & C.Av.R. 96; cert. granted,--U.S.
20 L.W. 3263. Other recent cases show the increasing propensity for Air
Force accidents to involve civilians. Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255 (E.D.
La. 1950) (military plane crashed into field where plaintiff's intestatc was picking
cotton, mortally wounding her); Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.

N.Y. 1949).

8 28 U.S.C. §§1346, 2671 et seq. (1946). The basic allegation of the plaintiffs

was wrongful death.
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 34; "Upon motion of any party.., the court in which an
action is pending may order any party to produce and permit the inspection of
copying... of any designated documents, paper
I

5 Reynolds

v. United States, supra note 2.

..

not privileged.

.

6 The court made this rvling under the authority of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2):

"If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order
made under Rule 34 to produce any document or other thing for inspection...
the court may make such orders as are just, and among others the following:
(i) An order that matters regarding which the questions were asked, or the contents of the paper .

.

. shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the

action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order.
7 Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
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sary procedure designed to guarantee a just result in litigation. 8 The fact
that the government is the defending party should not cause relaxation of
the requirement. Rather, the consequent inconvenience to public officers,
and expenditures of public funds in transmitting records, should a discovery
order be entered against the government, would seem to suggest that in
general the court should require a stronger showing of cause by the plaintiff
than if a private party were the litigant contesting the motion. However,
in the air crash tort case a showing of good cause should be at most a formality.9 The instrumentality involved in the accident is exclusively in the
possession and control of the air force. The military investigating body
is certain to be on the scene shortly after the accident, and its investigation
and report is likely to be completed before the victim is in a position to
understand what has occurred, or before his next of kin have been notified.
Furthermore, military expediency will generally demand security guard of
the area, immediate demolition of the wreckage, and re-assignment of the
surviving personnel. The victim is denied the opportunity of determining
the circumstances surrounding the accident, and is placed in a most precarious position, since that information will be vital to his case. Depositions
or interrogation of the survivors, providing they can be reached many
months after the accident, cannot substitute for the information contained
in the report. It may well be that without the report data, or the right to
examine or have experts examine the site of the crash, the plaintiff will be
unable to establish even the preliminary aspects of his cause of action. If
not allowed to examine the investigation report he faces loss of his chance
to seek recovery for his injuries.
Confronted with a discovery motion, the government may institute a
preliminary claim that it need not submit to discovery as must a private
litigant, though the plaintiff demonstrates cause. The theory of the argument runs from the proposition that a sovereign cannot be sued without its
consent, therefore, it cannot be made subject to the requirement of discovery in conjunction with a suit in the absence of its express acquiescence.' 0
The statute books are devoid of any such consent regulation. However, in
the Federal Tort Claims Act, Congress, the one branch of the government
which may subject the United States to suit," saw fit to place the government in a position similar to any private defendant in a civil tort action. 12 8 The good cause requirement has been written into the discovery rules.
"Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor ...
(italics supplied)
FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
9 For a convincing statement as to plaintiff's obvious ability to show good
cause for discovery of Air Force Crash Reports see Brauner v. United States,
10 F.R.D. 468, 470-71 (E.D. Pa. 1950). See also Simpson Use of Aircraft Accident
Investigation Information in Actions for Damages, 17 J. AIR L. 283 (1950)
(CAA provisions).
1o A similar contention was made in Bank Line v. United States, 76 F. Supp.
801 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). There the plaintiff sued the U.S. under the Suits in Admiralty Act for damages to his ship resulting from a collision between ingoing
and outbound convoys near Casablanca. The court assumed ". . . that the government could have annexed to its consent [to be sued] an absolute privilege of
non-disclosure of information in its possession. To the extent that it would have
made the assertion of some claims against the government futile, it would amount
to a constriction of the scope of the government's consent." Id. at 804; see also,
O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
11 Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255 (1896) ; United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196 (1882) ; Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433 (1878) ; Case v. Terrell, 11 Wall.
199 (U.S. 1870).
12 It appears that originally in the Tort Claims Act a special section dealt
with the problem of application of the Federal Rules to suits on tort claims against
the United States under the Act. The section was later dropped as unnecessary.
For a brief resume of the history see United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S.
543, 553 (1951) ; see also Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255 (W.D. La. 1950) ;
Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); Wunderly v. United
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Consequently, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are made applicable
against the United States in proceedings brought under that act. Government documents then become lawfully demandable by 13the party plaintiff
unless the matter demanded is protected by a privilege.
15
Should the records contain state, 14 military, or diplomatic' secrets they
would unquestionably be privileged and not subject to discovery. There the
interest of the individual litigant must bow to the superior interest of the
public welfare. Air force accident reports, stating testimony as to circumstances surrounding the accident and containing data gleaned from
examination of the wreckage, are not likely to contain such confidential
information. Faced by a claim of secrecy in the public interest, the courts
could adequately protect the national security by making an independent
personal examination of the documents in question. In that manner the
court would not abdicate to an executive department official its function of
17
It may safely be
determining the admissability of evidence in a law suit.
assumed the judiciary would weigh carefully the public interest prior to
issuing a discovery order, which may have the effect of publicizing confidential government records. It is realized that there are situations in
which the judge, faced with a wealth of material of a complicated and technical nature, would not be competent to decide whether such matter need be
States,-8 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1948). A similar position has been taken under
the Admiralty Act. O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948);
Henz v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 291 (N.D. Cal. 1949). The rationale is based
primarily on the fact that Congress could, if it had desired, place limitations
upon its consent to allow the government to be sued in tort and admiralty. Since
nothing can now be found in statutes or rules proscribing use of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in suits under the Tort Claims or Admiralty Acts, it must be
assumed Congress has acquiesced that the Government be treated in suits under
those acts as would a private litigant in the federal courts. For other examples
where the government is treated no differently than a private litigant see Bowles
v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (price control enforcement); Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1943) (Fair Labor
Standards Act) ; United States v. General Motors, 2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D. Ill. 1942)
(anti-trust) ; Fleming v. Bernardi, 4 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ohio 1941) (Fair Labor
Standards Act); But see Walling v. Comet Carriers, 3 F.R.D. 442 (S.D.N.Y.
1944).
13 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b), 34.
14 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875), Plaintiff's intestate made a
contract whereby he was to be paid $200 a month for secret services in gathering
information from the enemy during the Civil War. He was only paid his expenses
and his administrator now seeks enforcement of the remainder of the contract.
The Court finds the matter too confidential, holding that public policy must preclude establishment of a contract of this type in the courts. The information so
disclosed would be detrimental to the State.
15 Harris v. Walsh, 277 Fed. 569 (D.C. Cir. 1922) (draft records); In re
Grove, 180 Fed. 62 (3d Cir. 1910) (torpedo boat plans) ; Federal Life Insurance
Co. v. Holod, 30 F. Supp. 713 (M.D. Pa. 1940) (draft records); Pollen v. Ford
Instrument Co 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y 1939) (range finders); Firth Sterling
Steel v. BethleAem Steel Co., 199 Fed. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912) (armor-piercing projectiles); see also Duncan v. Cammel Laird & Co., (1942) A.C. 624 (submarine
plans).
16 Kessler v. Best, 121 Fed. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1903) (documents sought were
part of archives of German Consulate) ; Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Anglo-Persian
Oil Co. (1916) A.C. 822 (letter contained confidential information as to future
diplomatic and military course of operations).
17 United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D.
La. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 339 U.S. 940 (1950) was an anti-trust action where
the defendant sought certain government records. The government contended that
the attorney general had the right to determine the question of privilege as to the
documents. The court after careful consideration of the matter stated ". . . to
sustain this contention would, in effect, amount to an abdication of the Court's
duty to decide the matter . . . if the documents were submitted to the Court . ..
and if it appeared in the Court's judgment, that production of any part thereof
would be injurious to the public interest, they would be excluded; otherwise the
order to produce for the inspection of defendants would be sustained." Id. at
720-21.
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classified as secret.' s Under those circumstances he will be forced to rely
almost wholly on the recommendation of the executive department official
in charge of the records as to the confidential matter contained therein. The
independent judicial examination, however, will assure the litigant of some
check on arbitrary government refusal to produce documents. It seems
illogical that ". . . every subordinate in the [executive] department have
access to the secret, and not the presiding officer of justice."' 19 Absent some
overwhelming military consideration, the interest of the civilian victim
should control.
The usual claim of government privilege is not that of state secret, but
rather, a right of the executive branch of the government to refuse to disclose to outsiders the results of its housekeeping investigations. 20 The contention stems from the concept of separation of powers inherent in the
constitutional organization of our government. 21 From its inception each

branch, legislative, executive, and judicial has sought to operate in its own
sphere, and to refrain from infringing upon the independent provinces of the
others. True, this arbitrary organization has not been consistently maintained in practice, and could not be even if desired. Yet, the courts early
22
It
decided not to interfere wtih discretionary acts of executive officials.
18 Atomic energy matters may be cited as a prime example. The judge, not
a scientist, could not readily determine just what information as to the atomic
energy program should be unavailable to the public. A leak here might destroy
atomic arms leadership in the world. For an extended treatment of government
immunity in this all important field, see Haydock, Some Evidentiary Problems
Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirements, 61 HARv. L. REV. 468 (1948).
To meet the problem of such restricted data the author suggests the creation of
a special court of selected judges to meet from time to time, and handle claims
of privilege by the Atomic Energy Commission in regards to evidence sought to
be introduced by a party in a law suit.
19 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2378 (3d Ed. 1940). The "Great Man of Evidence"
exhibits strong feelings upon the subject of executive immunity. His exposition
and denunciation presents in clear forceful terms the case for the individual
against the government. Ahead of his time as usual, his presentation heralds
many of the arguments pro and con now commonplace in the cases where the
point is raised.
20 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2378a (3d ed. 1940).
21 See Berger and Krash, Government Immunity From Discovery, 59 YALE
L. J. 1451 (1950). Several other articles deal with similar subject matter. See
O'Reilly, Discovery Against the United States: A New Aspect of Sovereign Immunity?, 21 N. C. L. REV. 1 (1942) ; Pike and Fisher, Discovery Against Federal
Administrative Agencies, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1125, 1129-32 (1943); Sanford,
Evidentiary Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the Control of
Executive Departments, 3 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1949).
22 Perhaps the first word upon the subject occurs in Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803). There, Attorney General Lincoln objected to answering
certain questions posed by the Supreme Court. The Court in requiring Mr.

Lincoln to answer stated " . . . they had no doubt he ought to answer. There

was nothing confidential to be disclosed. If there had been, he was not obliged to
answer it." Id. at 144. The real problem in the case was whether mandamus
could issue against the Secretary of State to force him to deliver up a certain
commission to the plaintiff. The only duty-of the Secretary was to deliver the commission; there was no discretion to be exercised. Under those circumstances the
Court stated, "This then, is a plain case for a mandamus, either to deliver the
commission, or a copy of it from the record . . ." Id. at 173. The Court then held

that the writ, however, should not issue from the Supreme Court. Somewhat
later in Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (U.S. 1838), we find Mr. Justice
Thompson stating, ".

.

. the authority to issue the writ of mandamus to an

officer of the United States, commanding him to perform a specific act required
by a law of the United States, is within the scope of the judicial powers of the
United States, under the Constitution ... and ... there is nothing growing out

of the official character of the party that will exempt him from this writ, if the
act to be performed is purely ministerial." Id. at 617. See also, Aaron Burr's
Trial, 1 ROBERTSON'S REPT. 178-88 (1875). An earlier edition of the same work
contains additional language not found in the 1875 reprint, see II ROBERTSON'S
REPT. 535-36 (1808).
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would appear that control of departmental records would be within the
discretionary authority of the departmental chiefs, with full, power to
2
determine whether outsiders should be allowed to peruse the documents.
24
Congress has by statute seemingly acquiesced in that theory, and has given
impetus to the doctrine that where the government is not a party to the suit
the executive branch can with impunity refuse to submit executive records in
response to court subpoenas. 25 If the executive branch institutes a court
action, however, it is then considered to waive its immunity on submission
of public records. 26 The United States must be prepared to allow the court
and opposing counsel to inspect all relevant documents upon which its complaint is based or face dismissal of its action. That position appears to be
logical and in the best interests of the parties. Should the government be not
ready to make public its evidence, it should not institute suit. No defendant
should be made to defend against evidence of which he has no knowledge.
That rationale will not apply where the United States is made a party
defendant to a cause of action. The executive department no longer has
control over the decision to bring suit. It cannot then be said to consent to
waiver of executive immunity as the price for the privilege of seeking
judicial redress of an actionable wrong against the government. Despite the
doctrine of separation of powers, Congress admittedly has the power to
consent to allow suit to be brought against the United States. 27 It has been
suggested that the power to compel executive officials to produce documents
in their control must follow from the broader authority in the legislature to
waive sovereign immunity from suit. 28 The commentators proceeding upon
23 Hartranft's Appeal, 85 Pa. 433, 445, 27 Am. Rep. 667 (1877). "We had
better at the outset recognize the fact that the executive department is a coordinate branch of government, with power to judge what should or should not
be done, within its own department, and what of its own doings and communications should or should not be kept secret, and that with it, in the exercise of these
constitutional powers, the courts have no more right to interfere, than has the
executive, under like conditions, to interfere with the courts." A long line of
Attorney Generals have voiced similar opinions, see 25 Opinions of Attorneys
General 326 (W. H. Moody 1905); 40 Opinions of Attorneys General 45 (R. H.
Jackson 1941).
24 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1948) ; "The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of
its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and
property appertaining to it."
25 The leading. case is Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900).; The State
of Kentucky had instituted proceedings against one Block for evasion of state
and county liquor taxes. During the course of the trial an internal revenue agent
was asked to file certain reports as to liquor production of Block. In consequence
of his refusal, the County Court of Carroll County adjudged the agent guilty of
contempt. The United States Supreme Court upon habeas corpus petition ordered
the agent discharged from custody. "In our opinion the Secretary, under the
regulations as to the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers and
property appertaining to the business of his Department, may . . . reserve for
is own determination all matters of that character." Id. at 470; cf. EX parte
Sackett, 74 F. 2d 922 (9th Cir. 1935); Stegall v. Thurman, 175 Fed. 813 (N.D.
Ga. 1910); In re Lamberton, 124 Fed. 446 (W.D. Ark. 1903); In re Weeks, 82
Fed. 729 (D. Vt. 1897); In re Huttman, 70 Fed. 699 (D. Kan. 1895).
26 Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951)
(Criminal Indictment under Sherman Act); United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 339 U.S. 940 (1950)
(anti-trust) ; United States v. Grayson, 166 F. 2d. 863 (2d Cir. 1948) (mail
fraud) ; United States v. Beekman, 155 F. 2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) (price control) ;
Schlueter v. Watkins, 67 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 158 F. 2d 853
(2d Cir. 1946) (alien deportation); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F. 2d 503
(2d Cir. 1944) (criminal case); see also, Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260
(S.D.N.Y. 1945); Fleming v. Bernardi, 4 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ohio 1941).
27 See note 10, supra.
28 "Ultimately the claim of executive immunity from discovery rests on the
separation of powers. Pressed to its logical conclusion that argument would
immunize executive agencies from suits altogether. Yet, it is undebatable that

JUDICIAL
that theory fail to recognize a seemingly fundamental distinction between
the greater and lesser power. Practically, if Congress had not the prerogative
to authorize actions against the United States, no private litigant could seek
redress for wrongs committed under the aegis of government. The policy
underlying the extension of congressional power to alleviate the harsh
common law rule, that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent, is
clear. That is not to say, however, that the same policy may underlie an
extension of power to one of three supposedly equal arms of government to
impinge on the rights of the others. The fact that Congress can require the
government to submit to suit need not compel the inference that Congress and
the courts have the power to force the executive department to surrender
records. Especially should that be true where there is nothing in the Constitution or statutes which suggests that Congress has sought to exercise an
inferred power to compel production of executive documents in the case of
tort suits against the United States. Where Congress has desired to express
a policy in regard to executive records, it has known how to do so. 29 Absence
of a direct expression of this policy in the Federal Tort Claims Act 30 would
appear to indicate that Congress was satisfied with or felt powerless to
change existing executive discretion to refuse to submit official records.
It must be remembered that the court in the Reynolds case placed to one
side the situation where Congress has authorized and the courts have utilized
a subpoena directed to an executive department head demanding official
records in his control.3 1 Instead the court issued a discovery order, and in
reality gave the executive official a choice to comply or to refuse to submit
the department records. Should he decline, the court need not attempt to
enforce its order by contempt action, a procedure fraught with constitutional
dangers. 32 Instead it orders a decree establishing the issues in favor of the
plaintiff opponent. It may well be that under the Federal Rules Congress and
Congress may authorize -,uits against executive agencies, the separation of powers
notwithstanding. Given the power to bring administrators into court by summons,
the lesser power to subpoena or to compel them to produce documents logically
follows." Berger and Krash, Government Immunity From Discovery, 59 YALE
L. J. 1451 (1950).
29 "The Court of Claims may call upon any department or agency of the
United States for any information or papers it deems necessary . . .The head
of any department or agency may refuse to comply when, in his opinion, compliance will be injurious to the public interest." 28 U.S.C.A § 2507. ". . . no
part of any report or reports of the former Air Safety Board (A.S.B.) or the
Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.) relating to any accident, or the investigation
thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages
growing
out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports." 49 U.S.C.A. § 581.
30
But see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674; "The United States shall be liable, respecting
the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . " (emphasis
supplied). See also note 12, supra.
31 Perhaps the closest decision we have on the point is the recent case of
Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951). There a prisoner in a state prison sought
habeas corpus in the federal courts. During the proceedings the petitioner requested the court to issue a su'poena duces tecum to a subordinate official in the
Department' of Justice, ordering him to produce certain department records. The
court so ordered, and when the official refused, he was cited for contempt
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the contempt adjudication,
United States v. Ragen, 180 F. 2d 327 (7th Cir. 1950), and that decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court, Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S.462 (1951). The Court,
however, limited its holding to the specific fact situation. "We find it unnecessary
however, to consider the ultimate reach of the authority of the Attorney General
to refuse to produce at a court's order the government papers in his possession,
for the case as we understand it raises no question as to the power of the Attorney
General himself to make such a refusal . . .we limit our examination to what
this record shows, to wit, a refusal by a subordinate . . ." Id. at 467.
32 Thus, the Court then might be faced with the situation suggested by President Andrew Jackson's alleged remarks on hearing the result of the Supreme Court
decision in the case of Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (U.S. 1832). "Well,
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the courts have found a convenient escape hatch from the constitutional,
dilemma of separation of powers. The executive department head is forced
to make the difficult decision whether to press a defense and produce documents or to submit to loss of the case. 3 This is similar to the choice, averred
to previously, that the government need make prior to bringing suit on a
cause of action.
The question remains whether this form of coercion can avoid the substance of constitutional objection. Congress and the courts have seemingly
accomplished in combination that which neither could do directly alone.
However, under discovery procedure, and consequent action establishing the
issues in favor of the opponent should a discovery order be not obeyed, the
court acts only in its traditional sphere of deciding cases. It has not attempted to use the force and power of its process to compel the executive to
act in a specified manner. The choice of action or non-action is left to executive officials. The result of their decision governs the future action of the
court, and they have been given a free choice with full knowledge of the
consequences. This differs from the usual attempt by subpoena, mandamus,
or injunction to exact obedience to a directive of the court. The conceptual
distinction between a court order directing an official to act in a specified
manner and court action taken only after an executive official has pursued a
specific course of conduct may be sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of
the latter type of approach.
That position would appear to be well taken, since the result seems
salutary. It is important to protect the rights of the individual tort victim,
injured because of negligent activity on the part of the air force. To present
his case the victim needs information contained in the report of the investigating board. To allow the air force to determine alone whether or not it will
produce matter, which may well lead to a determination of fault in favor of
the tort victim, can only result in constant refusal to submit that information
to the court.3 4 Some sanction must be imposed to impress the executive
official with the magnitude of the problem, otherwise it becomes too easy to
discover privilege where in reality none should exist. The principle of loss
of the case, if the documents are not produced, removes temptation to take
the easy path in an attempt to escape liability. 5 Should a security matter be
present, it would appear that the court could well be taken into strict confidence. Furthermore, to allow executive officers to hide behind a veil of
immunity and privilege, at times when the national interest does not overwhelmingly demand such inconvenience to the public, could conceivably lead
to ". . . [non]disclosure of records merely because they might prove emJohn Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it . . ." see, 1 WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 729-79 (1947).
The alleged constitutional dangers referred to of course presuppose a complete breakdown of inter-departmental working relation between the three
branches of government. Such an event is not likely to occur unless anarchy reigns
in the land. But the possibility exists and must be recognized.
33 It may well be that the government would be wise to submit the documents
upon discovery motions unless considerations of national defense would preclude
attempt to use in evidence information gained from the government reports of
the accident, he then can be opposed with a hearsay or opinion evidence objection,
which may well be sustained. See Hubsch v. United States, 174 F. 2d 7 (5th Cir.
1949) (army jeep accident case, where testimony of investigating officer and his
report were successfully objected to as hearsay). But see Universal Air Lines v.
Eastern Air Lines, 188 F. 2d 993, 1951 U.S. Av. R. 20 (DC. Cir. 1951).
34 It would appear that this was the reason for placing sanctions in the
discovery rules for refusal to submit to the orders of the court. If refusal to
submit were left to the individual party, probably no one would ever obey a discovery order.
35 The liability we are concerned with is the liability of the government body,
not of the executive official. Wigmore points out that the securing of protection
for the individual officer is not a valid basis for executive immunity in the law
of evidence. See 8 WIGMORE, § 2378a (3d ed. 1940).
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barrassing to government officers." '8 6 In a democratic society information
should be open to all, except where its dissemination would endanger the
national welfare.
In a great many cases the claim of executive privilege is a result of mere
inertia and convenience.37 Subordinate officers acting under general regulations rarely consider merits when faced with demands for documents. Busy
with the pressure of routine, the inferior officer has not the time carefully
to consider the equities of the particular case. Many times he has little
comprehension of the ramifications of his action in approving or disapproving
the surrender of documents to the court. His superiors, especially in the
military, pressed with matters of national importance, are prone to accept
his decision without questioning its propriety. Thus, the claim of privilege
develops. There are few situations where it is justified. True, the air force
in the Reynolds case did claim knowledge on the part of witnesses, that testimony given before air force investigation boards might be used in later
litigation, ". . . would have a deterrent effect upon the much desired objective
of encouraging uninhibited statements in future inquiry proceedings instituted primarily in the interest of flying safety." 8 The promotion of the
highest degree of flying safety is an important function of our military air
force, and wherever possible should be encouraged by other branches of
government. But, the protection of the rights of civilians injured by the
military is a primary responsibility of the courts. Without the information
contained in the military report the civilian it at a distinct disadvantage. To
promote recovery for the injured party, where the air force has in fact been
negligent, is beneficial to the national interest. Liability is an effective antidote to continued carelessness, as much or more so than information gleaned
from military investigations. That factor, when coupled with a basic interest
in the dispensation of justice to litigants, suggests that the approach taken
in the Reynolds case is proper.

DIGEST OF RECENT CASES
INSURANCE -

AVIATION LIABILITY EXCLUSION CLAUSE INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE
Jordan v. Western States Life Ins. Co.,
N. Dak.-, -N.W. 2d-; 1951 U.S. & C. Av.R.66; (Dec. 18, 1951).
Death of insured resulted from riding in a private plane. The policy
had an aviation liability exclusion clause, as well as a two year incontestability clause, the latter as required by North Dakota statute. It was held
that this statutory requirement has the effect, after the period of contestability has expired, of nullifying the aviation liability exclusion clause. For
this reason there was judgment for the plaintiff. (The court recognized
that this result was peculiar to North Dakota, and that absent the statute
there would be no conflict between the exclusion and incontestability clauses,
referring to Anno. 17 A.L.R. 2d 1043, 1050 (1950).)
AVIATION LIABILITY EXCLUSION CLAUSE - DETERMINATION
OF CAUSE OF DEATH
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Smith,
193 F. 2d 511, 5th Cir., 1952 U.S. & C. Av.R. 68; (Jan. 11, 1952).
This case was noted in the last issue of the JOURNAL (Vol. 19, No. 1).
Since then it has been reversed on rehearing on the ground that the insurer
86 Reynolds v. United States, supra note 2 at 995.
37 For a documented exposition of this viewpoint see 8 WIGMORE, § 2378a
(3d ed. 1940).
38 Reynolds v. United States, supra note 2, at 994.
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has not met his burden of disproving the possibility that the death of the
insured resulted from a cause other than the aviation hazard.
AVIATION LIABILITY EXCLUSION CLAUSE - DEATH OF INSURED
IN AIRPLANE CRASH WHILE AIRPLANE PASSENGER
INTERPRETATION OF TERM "AERONAUTICS"
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Reed, - Tex. Civ. App.
246 S.W. 2d 311, 1952 U.S. & C. Av.R. 103; (Jan. 23, 1952).
The insured died as a result of the crash of the airplane in which he was
a passenger. The policy had a provision for double indemnity in case of
accidental death, and had a further provision expressly excluding death resulting from aeronautic flight. The court held, citing Clapper v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 157 F. 2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1946), that there was an ambiguity in
whether "aeronautic flight" means that the insured actually engages in the
operation of the plane, or is merely present in the plane; that such ambiguity
must be resolved against the insurer; that hence the beneficiary may collect
double indemnity on the insured's death. The dissenting judge thought
that the exclusion clause should be applied because in its wording there was
no requirement that the insured participate or engage in aeronautical flight,
but only that his death be the result of such flight.
LABOR LAW - TRANSFER OF AIR CARRIER ROUTE PROTECTION OF AIR CARRIER EMPLOYEES
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 194 F. 2d 211, 9th Cir.,
1952 U.S. & C.Av.R. 73; (Jan. 31, 1952).
The CAB retrospectively imposed labor protective provisions as a condition to the transfer by Western to United Air Lines of a certificate for the
operation of the Los Angeles-Denver route. The court held that the Board
had the statutory power to do this. CAA §401(i) provides that transfer of
certificates must be approved by the Board as. being consistent with the
public interest. The court found that conditions for the protection of
employees bear a substantial relation to public interest, relying on United
States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939), a case arising under the Interstate
Commerce Act. The court also held that the Board may impose such conditions after the transfer has been made if the necessity for such action
arises.
TORT -

TRESPASS - PROPERTY DAMAGE - LOW FLIGHT CRASH OF AIR FORCE JET PLANE
United States v. Gaidys, 194 F. 2d 762;
1952 U.S. & C.Av.R. 76 10th Cir. (Feb. 12, 1952).
An air force jet plane, while flying at 100 feet, crashed near plaintiff's
house, causing them personal injuries and property damage. The court held
that the liability of the United States under the Tort Claims Act was based
on trespass. Under modern law mere operation of the plane over plaintiff's
property is not a trespass; however, the plane must be operated at minimum
heights as prescribed by the CAB under the power to do so given it by
CAA §1 (24). Here the pilot violated the CAB regulation, the prescribed minimum height being 1000 feet over cities and 500 feet over other land areas.
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS - STATE STATUTE EXCLUDING
FOREIGN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
First National Bank of Chicago v. United Airlines, Inc.,
343 U.S. -, 72 S.Ct. 421; 1952 U.S. & C. Av.R. 39; (March 3, 1952).
A wrongful death action, which was brought in Illinois to recover for the
death of a passenger on an air carrier which crashed in Utah, was dismissed
by the federal district court for the Northern District of Illinois for lack of

JUDICIAL
jurisdiction, because of an Illinois statute which excludes all foreign death
actions capable of being prosecuted to judgment in the courts of the state
'where the death occurred. The court of appeals affirmed this judgment,
but the Supreme Court reversed it on the ground that the Illinois statute
violated the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, under the rule
of Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - CAB DISCRETION TO GRANT OR DENY
OPERATING AUTHORITY - RAILROAD CONTROLLED
AIR CARRIERS
National Air Freight ForwardingCorp. v. CAB,
F. 2d -, 20 L.W. 2469, D.C. Cir. (April 10, 1952).
The CAB, in a 1948 order giving some fifty air freight forwarders temporary operating authority, denied such authority to the petitioner because
it was railroad controlled. The Board did this under authority of §408(a)
(5) of the CAA which makes it unlawful for a surface carrier to acquire
control of an air carrier without CAB approval. The reason that railroad
ownership was found undesirable by the Board was that the forwarder's
railroad connection would give it a competitive advantage as well as an
incentive to divert potential air freight traffic to the railroad. The court
upheld the Board order, holding that this was a matter to be decided by the
Board in its expert judgment. It further found that the Board had not
acted arbitrarily or discriminatorily, even though in that same 1948 order
it had granted temporary operating authority to a railroad controlled railway
express agency. In the case of the express agency the court found three
factors, absent in petitioner's case, which justified the Board in granting
the express agency's application: (1) it had been operating in the air freight
field since 1929 (while the petitioner was newly organized to operate in this
field), and the Board and the court agreed that §408(a) (5) does not apply
to control relationships in existence before the passage of the CAA in 1938;
(2) it was found that there was a great public need for the express agency's
services in the air freight field, which no other applicant was seeking to
meet; (3) it was found that the agency, despite its railroad connections, had
consistently encouraged the solicitation and development of air express.
CONTRACTS - LIMITATION OF LIABILITY - REQUIRING NOTICE
OF DAMAGE CLAIMS WITHIN 90 DAYS OF THE ACCIDENT
AND INSTITUTION OF SUIT WITHIN ONE YEAR ADEQUACY OF NOTICE OF SUCH PROVISION
Shortley v. Northwestern Airlines, - F. Supp. -,
20 L.W. 2493, D.D.C. (April 17, 1952).
Failure to comply with the airline's tariff provision requiring notice of
damage claims within 90 days of the accident and the institution of suit
within one year does not bar a damage suit brought within the applicable
statute of limitations by a passenger holding a ticket issued subject to conditions of a contract contained in an accompanying bookfolder which merely
stated that time limits for giving notice and instituting actions are set forth
in the carrier's tariff. The inclusion of such provision does not operate as
a matter of law to preclude the injured passenger from maintaining the
action because nowhere in the Act or the CAB regulations is there any
authorization or requirement for the inclusion of such a provision in the
tariff. Therefore such a provision, to be binding on the passenger, must be
distinctly declared and deliberately accepted. The court found the facts
to indicate that such was not the case here.

